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Construction Law
by Brian J. Morrissey*
and
Matthew W. Wallace**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Nowhere is the downturn in the economy more pronounced than in the
construction industry. Contractors and subcontractors are going out of
business with increasing frequency. When a party to a construction project defaults on its obligations, everyone else involved in the project is
affected. Material suppliers may have been left unpaid, the bank must
examine its potential liability, the surety must determine its exposure,
and above all else, the work.must be completed. The cases and legislation
during this survey period reflect this aspect of the construction industry.
The most significant event during the survey period was the enactment
of new provisions in the mechanics' and materialman's lien statutory
framework. Agreements to waive liens before the material or services are
supplied are no longer valid. Accordingly, property owners and contrac*tors cannot rely on blanket lien waivers to prevent liens from being
placed on the property.
Also during the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled on
several lender liability issues further clarifying the potential exposure a
bank has when it becomes heavily involved in a construction project. The
economic downturn has also led to an increasing number of surety claims
as construction projects continue to fail. The changes in the law in the
last year make it absolutely imperative that the construction lawyers prepare their clients for the possible default by one of the other parties.
• Senior Associate in the firm of Brock & Clay, P.C., Marietta, Georgia. Davidson College
(B.A., 1978); University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (J.D., with honors, 1981). Member,
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Proper planning is the only way to reduce the harmful effects of.bankruptcy and business failure.
II.

LENDER RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS

During the preceding survey period, those decisions relating to lender
liability questions concerned the conduct of the lender in the disbursement of loan proceeds.' With the downturn in the economy and the recession in the construction industry, it should not be long before Georgia's
appellate courts are faced squarely with the question of when a lender
assumes the duties of a developer or other player in the construction process. The focus during this survey period, however, is on lender entanglements in a development and their effect on the lender's right to foreclose
under a security deed.
In Landor Condominium Consultants, Inc. v. Bankers First Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n,2 plaintiff Landor Condominium and the Colony
Place Company "attempted to develop a condominium project in Richmond County. Colony Place was to be the developer; and Landor was to
provide management services." s Bankers First Federal made a construction loan to Colony Place. Colony Place defaulted on the loan and was
placed into involuntary bankruptcy by Bankers First Federal.'
The bankruptcy court permitted Bankers First Federal to foreclose on
the project. The bank acquired the property at the foreclosure sale and
Landor Condominium made no attempt to stop the foreclosure. The
bankruptcy trustee settled the claims, which Colony Place had against
the bank. "[B]oth Colony Place and Landor Condominium released the
bank from all claims." s
Landor Condominium and Colony Place brought suit against Bankers
First Federal and one of its officers for "breach of contract, wrongful foreclosure and violations of Georgia's Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").' Together Colony Place and Landor Condominium contended that the bank failed to continue to finance the
construction of the project resulting in wrongful foreclosure, and that the
bank violated a partnership agreement between the bank and Colony
Place by failing to. continue the development of the project. Landor Con1. Brian J. Morrissey & Matthew W. Wallace, Construction Law, 43
141, 142-44 (1991).
2. 204 Ga. App. 212, 418 S.E.2d 772 (1992).
3. Id. at 212, 418 S.E.2d at 773.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id. at 212-13, 418 S.E.2d at 773-74.
Id. at 213, 418 S.E.2d at 774.
Id. at 212, 418 S.E.2d at 773.
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dominium alleged that it was a third-party beneficiary of the loan agreements between Colony Place and Bankers First Federal and that the
bank tortiously interfered with Landor Condominium's management contract with Colony Place. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the bank and its officer as to all claims, and plaintiffs appealed.8
The court of appeals rejected plaintiffs' argument that a partnership
agreement -existed between the bank and Colony Place under the loan
agreements, finding merely a relationship of lender/borrower, not partners or joint venturers, under the terms and conditions of the loan.' Accordingly, the bank was found merely to have agreed to loan money, but
not to finance the. project when the loan was in default.' ° Furthermore,
the court rejected Landor Condominium's claims on substantive grounds
holding that Landor Condominium could not assert a wrongful foreclosure claim because it had no interest in the property itself and could not
sue on the loan agreements, because it was not a third-party beneficiary
of those agreements." Moreover, the court held in connection with
Landor Condominium's tortious interference, claim that the bank was
"simply exercising its rights under the loan agreements" to foreclose and
thus could not have tortiously interfered with Landor Condominium's
contract with Colony Place.' 2
This case illustrates a trend by contractors and developers to recast the
role of lender as a principal player in the development of a construction
project. Courts now at least are reluctant to accept such a recharacterization of a lender's role, particularly in the absence of any conduct by the
lender or an exercise of control or power outside of those specifically delineated in its loan agreements.
In another foreclosure context, Brevard Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
5 plaintiff Ford Mountain
v. Ford Mountain Investments,"
Investments
("Ford Mountain") ,attempted to enjoin foreclosure commenced by Breyard Federal Savings & Loan ("Brevard Federal") under a deed to secure
debt. The original developer had borrowed money from Brevard Federal
but experienced financial problems and, with Brevard Federal's consent,
Ford Mountain assumed the project.' 4 Ford Mountain's interest was subordinated to the promissory note and the deed to secure debt under the
assumption agreement. Ford Mountain made payments on the note to
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
claims
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 213, 418 S.E.2d at 774.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court of appeals also held that the releases barred the wrongful foreclosure
and Landor Condominium's tortious interference claim. Id.
261 Ga. 619, 409 S.E.2d 36 (1991).
Id. at 619, 409 S.E.2d at 37.
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Brevard Federal although it was not liable on the original note itself. As a
result, when Ford Mountain failed to continue note payments, Brevard
Federal's only remedy against Ford Mountain was foreclosure."
Plaintiff Ford Mountain filed a declaratory action and sought an injunction against foreclosure. An injunction was entered by agreement
pending a hearing, but when Ford Mountain failed to make the next
monthly payment, Brevard Federal moved to dissolve the injunction. The
court denied the injunction and Brevard Federal appealed."
Subsequently,
the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law
...on the merits of the declaratory judgment action, holding the contract between the parties required Brevard [Federal] to release its interest in Highland Tops based on the wholesale1 appraisal value of the lots.
Brevard filed an amended notice of appeal. 7
The trial court determined that by failing to release the properties,
Brevard Federal excused Ford Mountain from continuing to make payments under the note. In rejecting that holding, the supreme court reiterated the long standing doctrine that "'a borrower who has executed a
deed to secure debt is not entitled to an injunction against the sale of the
property under a power in the deed, unless he first pays or tenders to the
creditor the amount admittedly due.' "s Therefore, even though an issue
concerning the proper release price for the lots remained for decision,
Ford Mountain could not discontinue payments on the note pending an
outcome of that question. Accordingly, the supreme court ruled that the
injunction should be dissolved due to Ford Mountain's failure to perform
those acts required of it under the contract.1'
15. Id. Similar to many development loans, the assumption documents contained an
agreement for release of residential lots sold by the developer. Under that agreement, Ford
was to pay 30% of appraised value of the lots to be released. Customarily, Ford had been
paying 30% of retail appraised value, but on September 27, 1990, Ford sought release of the
entire tract by tendering 30% of the wholesale appraised value of 34 lots. Id.
16. Id. at 619-20, 409 S.E.2d at 37.
17. Id. at 620, 409 S.E.2d at 38. Ancillary to the main holding in the case, the supreme
court reversed the findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the merits of the
complaint because the consent of both parties is required before consolidation of the injunction hearing and a hearing on the merits, and because Brevard had requested a trial by jury.
Id., 409 S.E.2d at 38-39. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52 (1982 & Supp. 1992) and § 9-11-65(a)(2)
(1982).
18. 261 Ga. at 620-21, 409 S.E.2d at 38 (quoting Wright v. Intercounty Properties, Ltd.,
238 Ga. 492, 494, 233 S.E.2d 160, 161 (1977)).
19. Id. at 621, 409 S.E.2d at 38-39.
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III.

A.

CONTRACT FORMATION, CONSTRUCTION AND BREACH

Contract Formation

Apparent Authority and Agency. In Hussey, Gay & Bell v. Georgia Ports Authority, 0 Clay-Ric, Inc., a subcontractor on a warehouse extension construction project at Georgia Ports Authority's ocean terminal
facility, subcontracted with the general contractor to pave the floor of the
warehouse. Hussey, Gay & Bell prepared the plans and specifications for
the project on behalf of Georgia Ports Authority. After initial installation,
the poured floor became wet as a result of work performed on site by the
general contractor and other contractors, and, therefore, failed
to pass a
2
load test performed by the architect, Hussey, Gay & Bell.

1

The general contractor directed Clay-Ric to repave the floor, but failed
to pay Clay-Ric for the repaving work, an expense in excess of $40,000.
Clay-Ric brought suit against the general contractor, Hussey, Gay & Bell,
and Georgia Ports Authority to recover the amounts allegedly owed for
the repaving work.22 Georgia Ports Authority moved for summary2 judgment, which was granted and subsequently appealed by Clay-Ric. 3
The gravamen of Clay-Ric's complaint is that Georgia Ports Authority,
"directly or through its agents, authorized the paving repair work and
represented that Clay-Ric would be paid for the work. '2 4 In support of
the motion for summary judgment, Georgia Ports Authority submitted an
affidavit of its director of engineering and construction, who testified that
Georgia Ports, Authority never had any contract with Clay-Ric for basic
contract or extra work, that Georgia Ports Authority never authorized extra work, that Georgia Ports Authority "neither authorized the paving
repair work nor represented that [it] would pay Clay-Ric for the repair
work, and that [Hussey, Gay & Bell] had no authority to contract with
Clay-Ric on the [Georgia. Ports Authority's] behalf."26 "Clay-Ric
[presented] the affidavit of its president, who stated that he was instructed by representatives of [Hussey, Gay & Bell] that the repair work
was to be paid for by the [Georgia Ports Authority]. 2 6 Clay-Ric also submitted deposition testimony of the general contractor's representative
who stated that one of Hussey, Gay & Bell's engineers committed to
Clay-Ric's representative that if Clay-Ric performed the work, Hussey,
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Hussey, Gay & Bell v. Georgia Ports Auth., 92 F.C.D.R. 1014.
Id. at 1014.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1015.
Id.
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Gay & Bell would make sure Clay-Ric was paid for it.2 7 Clay-Ric

presented no evidence taking issue with Georgia Ports Authority's contention that it did not authorize the repair work or represent that it
would pay Clay-Ric for the repairs.2 6

Clay-Ric asserted on appeal that an issue of fact existed concerning
Hussey, Gay & Bell's authority "to contract with Clay-Ric for the extra
work on behalf of the [Georgia Ports Authority]. 2 9 In rejecting that contention, the court of appeals noted that" '[tihe bare assertion or denial of
the existence of an agency relationship is a statement of fact when made
by one of the purported parties to the relationship; but when made by an
outsider, bare assertions or denials are mere conclusions of law.' ,,sO As a
result, Georgia Ports Authority's affidavit that Hussey, Gay & Bell, was
not its agent was a statement of fact that Clay-Ric did not overcome with
its conclusory affidavits. The court held "H G & B's role as the engineer
did not automatically confer upon H G & B the power to enter into contracts on behalf of GPA."' 1
The court also rejected Clay-Ric's argument that an implied contract
existed with Georgia Ports Authority under theories of quantum meruit
and unjust enrichment.2 2 The court reiterated Georgia precedent, which
holds that "a materialman or subcontractor [cannot] recover against an
owner or general contractor with whom it has no contractual relationship,
based on a theory of unjust enrichment or implied contract; rather, it
is
8' 3
limited to the statutory remed[y] provided by Georgia's lien statute.
B. Contract Construction
Warranties. In McDevitt & Street Co. v. K-C Air Conditioning Service, Inc.,84 McDevitt & Street Co. entered into a general contract to provide a waste water riser system in an Embassy Suites Hotel. Plaintiff McDevitt & Street entered into a subcontract with defendant K-C Air
Conditioning Service, Inc. ("K-C Air"), for the design, purchase, and in27.
28.

Id.
Id.

29. Id.
30. Id. at 1015 (quoting Coley Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Colonial Eggs of Alma, Inc., 165 Ga.
App. 108, 299 S.E.2d 165 (1983)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. See O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-360 to -366 (1982 & Supp. 1992). See also PPG Indus.,
Inc. v. Hayes Constr. Co., 162 Ga. App. 151(1), 290 S.E.2d 347 (1982). The court also rejected Clay-Ric's argument that accepting the repair work without compensation was an
unlawful taking of property by the state without just and adequate compensation as required by the Georgia Constitution. 92 F.C.D.R. at 1015.
34. 203 Ga. App. 640, 418 S.E.2d 87 (1992).
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stallation of the system. 3 The subcontract agreement provided that the
work be "performed by subcontractor in a good and workmanlike manner
strictly in accordance with the Contract Documents

...

,,a The subcon-

tract further stated the following:
Subcontractor Warrants and guarantees the Work to the full extent provided for in the Contract Documents. Without limiting the foregoing or
any other liability or obligation with respect to the Work, Subcontractor
shall, at its expense and by reason of its express warranty, make good
any faulty, defective, or improper parts of the Work discovered within
one year from the date of acceptance of the project by the Architect and
Owner or within such longer period as may be provided in the Contract
Documents. 7
The general conditions contained in a American Institute of Architects
("AIA") Form A201 and incorporated into the contract made the subcontractor "bound to the Contractor by the terms of the Contract Documents, and to assume toward the Contractor all the obligations and responsibilities which the Contractor by these documents assumes toward
the Owner and the Architect.""8 Under AIA Form A201, the general contractor further warrants to the owner that "[aill Work will be of good
quality, free from faults and defects and in conformance with the Contract Documents. All Work not conforming to these requirements . . .
may be considered defective .

. .

. This warranty is not limited by the

provisions of Paragraph 13.2."l' The subcontract further required defendant to furnish a performance bond in an amount equal to the contract
price. 40 Wassau Insurance posted the performance bond, which remained
in duplicative effect until such time as defendant "shall well and truly
perform all of the undertakings . . . and conditions and agreements of
-41
[the] subcontract within the time provided therein ....

35. Id. at 640, 418 S.E.2d at 89.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id., 418 S.E.2d at 89-90. American Institute of Architects Contract A201, 1967 Edition, as amended by supplementary conditions, was incorporated into this agreement. Id.
39. Id. at 640-41, 418 S.E.2d at 90.
Paragraph 13.2.2, relating to "correction of the work," required that if within "one
year after acceptance by Owner ... or within such longer period of time as may
be prescribed by law ... any of the Work is found to be defective or not in accordance with the contract documents, the contractor shall correct it promptly after
receipt of written notice to do so" unless Owner has "given a written acceptance of
such condition. This obligation shall survive termination of the contract."
Id. at 641, 418 S.E.2d at 90.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Slightly more than two years after opening, in February 1988, plaintiff,
general contractor, received complaints about ten random leaks in the
plumbing risers of the hotel. The leaking caused ceiling tiles to fall and
raw sewage to penetrate the restaurant and meeting rooms of the hotel.
Affected guest suites were out of service for three days while leak repairs
were effectuated. Leaks then began occurring more frequently. Plaintiff
notified its subcontractor and Wassau Insurance of its claim against the
subcontractor due to the failure of the mechanical connections on the
plumbing risers. After several meetings, the owner, plaintiff, and defendant, but not Wassau Insurance, agreed that a system wide failure had
occurred requiring extensive repair to avoid repeated patching. An analysis of sections removed during the repairs showed an 42adhesive failure resulting from contaminated cement used at the joints.
Plaintiff offered the subcontractor the opportunity to correct the problem, which it declined, and plaintiff paid another subcontractor
$151,986.97 to effectuate the repair. The owner also had damages resulting from its inability to use the facility. Plaintiff's total losses were
$338,594.57.

4 s

Plaintiff brought suit against the subcontractor for negligence, breach
of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, and the expenses of
litigation and against Wassau Insurance for defendant's, K-C Air, failure
to perform. Plaintiff sought actual damages, a twenty-five percent bad
faith penalty, and attorney fees from Wassau." The trial court granted
defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the default provisions of the contract that provided the following:
Should Subcontractor at any time: fail to supply .the labor, materials,
equipment, supervision and other things required ... of sufficient quality to perform the Work with the skill [and] conformity . . . required
hereunder . . . or fail in the performance or observance of any of the
each of
covenants, conditions, or other terms of the subcontract ....
which shall constitute a default hereunder by Subcontractor, Contractor
shall, after giving Subcontractor notice of default 48 hours within which
to cure, have right to exercise any one or more of [four specified]
remedies. 4"
The trial court also granted a directed verdict on the damages paid to the
46
owner for the loss of the use of the hotel.
42. Id. at 641-42, 418 S.E.2d at 90.
43. Id. at 642, 418 S.E.2d at 90-91.
44. Id., 418 S.E.2d at 91. Those penalties are set forth in O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 (1992).
45. 203 Ga. App. at 642-43, 418 S.E.2d at 91.
46.. Id. at 643-44, 418 S.E.2d at 92. The decision deals with a host of issues unrelated to
construction of the contract. For treatment of the bond related issues, see infra text accompanying notes 227-44.
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The court of appeals reversed the trial court exclusion of the default
provision under the contract." Seemingly, the trial court ruling relied
upon the one year warranty period. The court of appeals found that the
contract obligated the subcontractor "to provide labor, material and
equipment necessary to perform good quality work, free from faults and
defects, and an event of default was deemed to have occurred should the
contractor 'at any time' fail to do so.' 4 Thus, under an indemnification
provision of the subcontract, the subcontractor must indemnify the contractor as a result of the insufficiency of its performance.4 9
Cost Plus Contract. In Maddox v. Brown,50 "plaintiffs John and
Pamela Brown entered into a contract with defendant Frank Maddox d/
b/a Frank Maddox Construction Company for the building of a house."'"
The contract called for the house to be built on a "cost plus" basis, with
plaintiffs to reimburse the contractor for all costs of construction plus a
fee of $5,500. 62

After completion of the house, plaintiffs sued defendant contractor for
breach of contract and fraud, based upon overpayments resulting from
lack of documentation of expenses, defects in the construction of the
house, and misrepresentations concerning the expected services and
overcharges. The contractor counterclaimed for additional payments allegedly due. The court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs for actual
damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees and the defendant
appealed."
The contractor also appealed the grant of a directed verdict against his
counterclaim for additional costs of construction. Under a "cost plus"
contract, the defendant must prove the amount of costs incurred through
bills submitted. The evidence at trial showed that plaintiffs paid the contractor in excess of the bills submitted and thus, no additional monies
would be due under that particular contract."
Joint Payment Agreement. It is commonplace in construction
projects for payment disputes to arise between lower-tiered subcontractors and suppliers. Sometimes these lower-tiered contractors agree to
have payments made by joint check to protect their claims in the proceeds without hindering progress on the job. In Georgia Glass & Metal,
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

203 Ga. App. at 642-43, 418 S.E.2d at 91-92.
Id. at 643, 418 S.E.2d at 91.
Id.
200 Ga. App. 492, 408 S.E.2d 7.19 (1991).
Id. at 492, 408 S.E.2d at 719.
Id., 408 S.E.2d at 719-20.
Id. at 492-93, 408 S.E.2d at 720.
Id. at 493, 408 S.E.2d at 720.
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Inc. v. Arco Chemical Co,.,5 Georgia Glass & Metal, Inc. ("Georgia
Glass") entered into a general construction contract with Investment
Syndications, Inc. to furnish material and labor for construction of a condominium project. Defendant Arco Chemical Company ("Arco") provided
materials to Georgia Glass for incorporation into this work. On October 9,
-1984, Georgia Glass submitted its first purchase order to Arco, showing
the terms of sale. As a result of Arco's concern with the financial stability
of Georgia Glass, Georgia Glass agreed with the owner making payment
on the project for the use of joint checks made payable to Georgia Glass
and Arco." The agreement provided the following:
It is our understanding that [Arco] is furnishing the aluminum requirements to GEORGIA GLASS & METAL, INC. for the [Phoenix Condominium] job. At the request of [Arco] and GEORGIA GLASS &
METAL, INC. this will confirm that payment in the amount of $225,000
will be jointly payable to [Arco] and GEORGIA GLASS & METAL,
INC. in accordance
with the terms of sale which are thirty days from
57
date of invoice.

Subsequently, the owner began experiencing financial difficulties and filed
for bankruptcy. "Georgia Glass filed a lawsuit against the owner and a
mechanic and materialman's lien against the condominium project; both
however, were stayed by the filing of the bankruptcy petition.""
Arco sued Georgia Glass for payment of unpaid invoices on May 26,
1988. The trial court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of
Arco holding that "the joint pay agreement did not relieve Georgia Glass
of its obligation to pay Arco, even when the owner had not paid Georgia
Glass." 5 '
On appeal, Georgia Glass argued that it construed the joint pay agreement to mean that both Georgia Glass and Arco would receive payments
directly from the owner and that neither would be entitled to any monies
other than from the owner.'0 Georgia Glass further argued that Arco
knew of the interpretation of the agreement that Georgia Glass had "but
remained silent even though Arco interpreted the agreement
differently." '
55.
56.
57.
58.

201 Ga. App. 15, 410 S.E.2d 142 (1991).
Id. at 15-16, 410 S.E.2d at 142-43.
Id. at 16, 410 S.E.2d at 143.
Id.

59. Id.
60. Id. In essence, Georgia Glass wished to construe the joint pay agreement as a "pay
when paid" agreement that would obviate Georgia Glass' contractual obligations to Arco in
the event that it did not receive payments from the owner.
61. Id. Georgia Glass relies upon O.C.G.A. § 13-2-4 (1982), which provides the following:
"The intention of the parties may differ among themselves. In such case, the meaning
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In rejecting Georgia Glass' argument, the court noted that a condition

precedent may make the obligation to make payment to a subcontractor
or supplier contingent upon payment by the owner or a higher-tiered contractor. 2 The court found Georgia Glass mistaken about the effect of the
joint payment agreement.63 Therefore, the trial court interpretation of the
agreement is correct and the agreement did not discharge Georgia Glass
from any obligation to 'make payment to Arco.6
Accord and Satisfaction.

In Dawson Construction Co. v. Georgia

State Financing& Investment Commission," plaintiff Dawson Construction Company ("Dawson") entered into a construction contract with the
Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission ("GSFIC") to renovate an old state office building. In response to a payment application in
the amount of $1,065,057.16 on March 9, 1988, GSFIC issued a check to
Dawson Construction in the amount of $863,599.06. Prior to the issuance
of this check the president of the construction company and a representative of GSFIC met to review various claims filed by the construction company and subcontractors for damages incurred on the project. GSFIC also
asserted .claims against the contractor for defective and unfinished work.
At this meeting the parties agreed to defer negotiation of their respective
claims until a later date."
The check issued on March 9, 1988, contained the following endorsement: "NEGOTIATION OF THIS CHECK CONSTITUTES PAYMENT IN FULL OF ITEMS LISTED ON THE VOUCHER. '67 An accompanying memorandum and voucher further provided: "FINAL
PAYMENT EXCEPT FOR THE SUM OF $200,000.00 WITHHELD
FOR INCOMPLETE WORK."' Article E-25(b) of the construction con-

tract provided the following:
Acceptance of the final payment shall operate as and shall be a release to
the owner from all claims of any kind or character under the contract
except for such specific amount or amounts as may have been withheld
to cover the fair value of any incomplete work, which has been certified
by the architect under the provision of Paragraph (d) of Article 5 of the
placed on the contract by one party and known to be thus understood by the other party at
the time shall be held as the true meaning." Id.
62. 201 Ga. App. at 17, 410 S.E.2d at 143. This is the quintessential "pay when paid"
clause.
63. Id.
64. Id., 410 S.E.2d at 143-44.
65. 203 Ga. App. 625, 417 S.E.2d 190 (1992).
66. Id. at 625-26, 417 S.E.2d at 190.
67. Id. at 626, 417 S.E.2d at 191.
68. Id.
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Form of Agreement as incomplete through no fault on the part of the
contractor."
On March 11, 1988, the president of the general contractor wrote
GSFIC to confirm the agreement reached at the earlier meeting to defer
review of the outstanding claims. The general contractor noted that, despite the conditional language on the voucher memorandum concerning
withholding of $200,000, the check represented a final payment, but that
the general contractor was not, by accepting the check, waiving its right
to assert claims for damages.7 0
On March 15, 1988, GSFIC wrote to the general contractor indicating
that the general contractor had agreed to give up one of its claims at the
earlier meeting, which allowed GSFIC to compute the amount in the
check. GSFIC also asserted that it denied certain subcontractor claims,
but indicated that other certain claims were considered still pending and
that GSFIC had pending unresolved claims against the general contractor
itself. GSFIC asked for a mutual release or covenant not to sue in an
after which GSFIC would issue a check for
attempt to settle all claims,
1
the remaining $200,000.7
After receiving this reply, the general contractor deposited the check.
GSFIC claimed this constituted an accord and satisfaction of all claims,
including any claim to retainage, except the specific claims of certain subcontractors specifically indicated as still pending. Despite this contention,
on August 8, 1988, the general contractor wrote to GSFIC requesting onehalf of the retainage. On August 18, 1988, GSFIC issued an additional
check in the amount of $100,000, which contained the same conditional
language as the earlier check concerning final payment. The voucher
memorandum accompanying the check also contained the7 2 same language
substituting $100,000 as the amount still being withheld.
On Otober 5, 1988, the general contractor requested the remainder of
the retainage and asked for a decision on its claims against GSFIC. On
November 18, 1988, GSFIC indicated that the claims of the particular
subcontractors still pending were denied, but indicated that GSFIC was
going to make final payment as soon as all contract requirements were
met. No further payments were made and the general contractor brought
suit for delay damages and for the claims of its subcontractors against
GSFIC. GSFIC answered the complaint and raised the defense of accord
and satisfaction. GSFIC also brought a counterclaim against the general
contractor for damages it suffered as a result of the incomplete and defec-

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 626-27, 417 S.E.2d at 191.
Id. at 627, 417 S.E.2d at 191.
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tive work. Subsequent to the answer, GSFIC sent the general contractor a
third check in the amount of $90,770.73 with the same conditional language contained in the previous checks, vouchers, and memoranda, except
indicating that only $7,500 was withheld for incomplete work. The general contractor never negotiated the third check and returned it to
GSFIC.

7

3

GSFIC moved for summary judgment based upon its74defense of accord
and satisfaction, which was granted. Dawson appealed.
The principal questions answered on appeal were the following: Did
GSFIC and Dawson have a meeting of the minds regarding the claims
that the accord and satisfaction encompassed, and did GSFIC waive any
accord and satisfaction defenses by its acts or conduct.1' The court found
that Dawson in its pay request number twenty-nine did not seek final
payment.7 6 When Dawson received the March 9 check marked as final
payment, it sought clarification from GSFIC as to the meaning of the
conditional language and believed that it represented final payment
under the contract only of the amount of $863,599.06. None of the checks
contained any reference to waiver of any subcontractor claims, 7thus, creating fact questions as to the scope of accord and satisfaction.
Generally, questions concerning an accord and satisfaction are for the
jury.7' The court concluded that the sequence of events surrounding the
issuance of the checks, ambiguity in the language in relationship to those
facts, and the issuance of three checks raised questions of fact for resolution by a jury concerning the meeting of the minds issue. 7'9
The court further found that GSFIC's conduct subsequent to the
tender of the March 9 check, including the tender of the additional
checks and GSFIC's consideration of subcontractor claims supposedly
embodied within the alleged accord and satisfaction, raised questions of
fact concerning if GSFIC waived the accord and satisfaction."
73. Id. at 627-28, 417 S.E.2d at 191-92.
74. Id. at 628, 417 S.E.2d at 192.
75. Id. The court dismissed out of hand questions concerning whether the alleged accord
and satisfaction was supported by consideration, whether there was a bona fide dispute as to
the amount due Dawson, whether the conditional language used on the checks was sufficient
to constitute an accord and satisfaction and whether there was sufficient evidence presented
of satisfaction of the alleged accord. Id. See Wood Bros. Constr. Co. v. Simons-Eastern Co.,
193 Ga. App. 874, 389 S.E.2d 382 (1989). See also O.C.G.A. §§ 13-4-102 to -103 (1982).
76. 203 Ga. App. at 630-31, 417 S.E.2d at 193-94.
77. Id. at 630, 417 S.E.2d at 194.
78. Id. at 631, 417 S.E.2d at 194.
79. Id. at 630-31, 417 S.E.2d at 194.
80. Id. at 631, 417 S.E.2d at 194.
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C. Breach and Remedies
Measure of Damages for Defective Workmanship. In Paul
Davis Systems, Inc. v. Peth,81 plaintiff Peth sued Paul Davis Systems for
defective repair work to a fire damaged house. Expert testimony
presented by the plaintiff showed the extent of repairs necessary to correct defects in the workmanship of the defendant. The jury entered a
verdict against the defendant in the amount of $40,000.82
Defendant contended that the evidence did not permit calculations of
damages by the jury with reasonable certainty. The court, in rejecting
that argument, reaffirmed the proposition that the jury is not permitted
to guess as to the amount of damage, but must calculate the loss with
reasonable certainty.83 The plaintiff is not required to establish exact
figures, but merely provide sufficient data to estimate the damages with
reasonable certainty." The measure of damages for defective workmanship is the cost of repair of the defect."5
IV.

TORT LIABILITY-CONTRACTUAL DUTIES AND FRAUD

A. Prima Facia Case
In Maddox v. Brown,86 plaintiffs John and Pamela Brown contracted
with Frank Maddox to construct a house. The contract was a "cost plus"
arrangement. After completion of the house, the plaintiffs sued Maddox
for breach of contract and fraud, alleging overpayment. The jury awarded
the plaintiffs' damages in the amount of $21,843.69, plus $30,000 in punitive damages and $6,560 in attorney fees. Maddox appealed.
At trial, Maddox moved for directed verdict on the claims of fraud, and
on appeal raised the denial of this motion as a ground for reversal.8 7 "Defendant [Maddox), however, represented that if he were hired as general
contractor he would be able to pass along savings to the plaintiffs by obtaining a contractor's discount on materials," but evidence at trial showed
that the contractor had not received a discount on certain items. s "Defendant also did not see that the correct amount of sales tax was charged
81.

201 Ga. App. 734, 412 S.E.2d 279 (1991).

82.
83.

Id. at 734, 412 S.E.2d at 280.
Id. at 735-36, 412 S.E.2d at 281.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 736, 412 S.E.2d at 281.
86. 200 Ga. App. 492, 408 S.E.2d 719 (1991). For additional treatment of this decision,
see supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
87. 200 Ga. App. at 492-93, 408 S.E.2d at 719-20.
88. Id. at 493-94, 408 S.E.2d at 720.
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for materials billed to the plaintiffs."89 Defendant further represented
that the construction would be completed within ninety days of the closing of the construction loan, however, construction took almost twice as
long to complete. 0
At trial, defendant could not produce all the bills for material and labor
that he charged to the plaintiffs. As a result, the court of appeals found
that this evidence warranted submission of the question of fraud to the
jury. These 92allegations of fraud sufficiently supported a claim for punitive damages.

This case. illustrates the slight evidence necessary to present a fraud
case to the jury arising out of a construction contract. One must wonder
whether any delay in the completion of a construction project will warrant allegations of fraud premised upon the promised original date for
completion. If that is so, let the contractor beware."
B. Election of Remedies
9
In American Demolition, Inc. v. Hapeville Hotel Ltd. Partnership,
plaintiff American Demolition entered into a contract with Hapeville Hotel Limited Partnership to demolish the old Atlanta Airport Hilton Hotel,
"to remove all asbestos and underground foundations, to backfill all holes
and to recompact the soil." 95 The parties based their contract upon the
American Institute of Architects' ("AIA") form contract, plus a nineteen
page addendum of supplementary conditions.9
The contract contained two merger clauses. One of those clauses provided the following: "[tihe Contract documents form the Contract for
Construction. This Contract represents the entire and integrated agreement between the parties hereto and supersedes all prior negotiations,
97

representations, or agreements, either written or oral.

American Demolition encountered unforeseen problems stemming from
the building's foundation being more extensive than had been anticipated
coupled with a wet subsurface soil condition caused by a drainage prob89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 494, 408 S.E.2d at 720-21.
92. Id., 408 S.E.2d at 721.
93. For an example of a fraud case involving a false contractor's affidavit under the materialman's lien statute, see Steimer v. Northside Bldg. Supply Co., 202 Ga. App. 843, 415
S.E.2d 688 (1992). For another example of the slight circumstances sufficient to establish a
case for fraud, see DCA Architects, Inc. v. American Bldg. Consultants, Inc., 203 Ga. App.
598, 417 S.E.2d 386 (1992).
94. 202 Ga. App. 107, 413 S.E.2d 749 (1991)..
95. Id. at 107, 413 S.E.2d at 750.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 108, 413 S.E.2d at 750.
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lem at the site. American Demolition did not complete the contract requirements and was not paid for some of the work. American Demolition
then filed suit to recover payment of the contract balance and additional
costs." .
Part of American Demolition's theory of recovery hinged upon a claim
for fraud. The trial court granted summary judgment on this count
against American Demolition, which appealed." The thrust of American
Demolition's argument concerning fraudulent concealment is that the defendant misrepresented and concealed site conditions, particularly the
drainage problem, the extensive nature of the foundation, and the wet
condition of subsurface soils. This argument is premised upon the nondisclosure of the two engineering reports, which revealed these problems,
but were not disclosed to American Demolition. American Demolition
contended in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that it was
not aware of the reports or the unusual subsurface conditions.10 0
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment, because American Demolition failed to rescind the contract, and by
failing to do so, the merger clause in the contract barred the fraud
claim.10 1 The court held the following:
In an action for fraud, "[i]f the defrauded party has not rescinded but
has elected to affirm the contract, he is relegated to a recovery in contract and the merger clause will prevent his recovery. This result obtains
because where the allegedly defrauded party affirms a contract which
contains a merger or disclaimer provision and retains the benefits, he is
estopped from asserting that he relied upon the
other parties' misrepre0
sentation and his action for fraud must fail."M2
American Demolition, having made no effort to rescind the contract, was
bound by its remedies and had elected to sue under the contract.108
The court of appeals further rejected American Demolition's argument
that it was prevented from exercising an independent judgment in making the contract, because of the concealment, which concerned the very
subject matter of the contract.'" The court of appeals found the transaction to be at arm's length, thus, giving. rise
to no special or confidential
10
relationship requiring a duty to disclose. '
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
S.E.2d

Id., 413 S.E.2d at 751.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 108-09, 413 S.E.2d at 751 (citing Mitchell v. Head, 195 Ga. App. 427, 394
114 (1990)).

103. Id.
104. Id. at 109, 413 S.E.2d at 752.
105. Id.
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C. Premises Liability

In King v. Midas Realty Corp.,'0 6 the court of appeals clarified the potential tort liabilities of a general contractor.1 0 7 Midas Realty hired D &
M Contractors, Inc. ("D & M") to build a muffler shop on Midas' property. During construction, an eighteen foot brick wall collapsed on three
employees, killing two and injuring the third. Midas Realty successfully
sought summary judgment on the grounds that Midas had surrendered
possession of the site, including site safety functions.108
Plaintiffs appealed contending that the terms of the contract between
D & M and Midas, which required that all work be performed to Midas'
satisfaction, were sufficient to hold Midas liable for the tort. 0 ' The court
quickly dealt with the issue stating that the "'evidence is clear that the
premises were "surrendered" to [D & M], that [D & M's] status as an
independent contractor was not "interfered" with by [appellee], that the
duty of providing for the safety of workers was accordingly upon [D &
M], and that no such duty was owed by [appellee].' "110 The impact of
this decision is to clarify, the responsibilities of landowners when they employ contractors on their premises. In order to ensure proper liability protection, the property owner should completely surrender possession and
control of.the property to the contractor.
V.

ARBITRATION

During the last two survey periods, the authors have detailed the continued conflict in the Georgia courts regarding the enforceability and applicability of arbitration clauses in construction contracts.1 ' Unlike previous years, there has been little significant activity in the arbitration
field.
Nonetheless, several decisions are of interest to the practitioner. In National Parents'Resource Institute for Drug Education,Inc. v. Peachtree
Hotel Co., '1 the court of appeals held that a party may "participat[e]
fully in the defense of the action without ever requesting or demanding
arbitration, moving for dismissal, moving for a stay, or moving to compel
106.
107.

King v. Midas Realty Corp., 92 F.C.D.R. 1024.
Id. at 1024.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1024-25 (quoting Bryant v. Village Centers, 167 Ga. App. 220, 222, 305 S.E.2d
907 (1983)).

111. See Morrissey & Wallace, supra note 1, at 156-61.
112. 201 Ga. App. 637, 411 S.E.2d 884 (1991). See also Tillman Group, Inc. v. Keith, 201
Ga. App. 680, 411 S.E.2d 794 (1991) (failure to bring motion for arbitration in magistrates

court waived right).
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arbitration, or taking any action to present the arbitration issue to the
trial court for a ruling."'1 8 Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the
party "not only waived its contractual right to seek arbitration, but also
waived this issue in the trial court."'1 4 The court's message is clear-any
objections to legal process on the basis of.an arbitration clause should be
raised early and often.11
Also, two decisions in neighbor states are worthy of note. First, the Alabama Supreme Court has held that arbitration cannot be compelled when
the dispute was not submitted to the architect involved first.1 " In Ex
Parte Williams,' 7 the owner of an office building discovered substantial
defects in a newly completed office building. When the contractor failed
to correct the problem, the owner filed suit. The contractor moved to
compel arbitration."1 On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that
the contract required that all disputes be first submitted to the architect
prior to arbitration.1 1' The contractor's failure to submit the dispute to
the architect invalidated the arbitration clause.120
In Florida, the court of appeals held that when a bond agreement incorporates a construction contract, the surety could rely on the arbitration clause.121 This decision indicates that courts are becoming increasingly willing to allow arbitration agreements to control. The
persuasiveness of these decisions for the Georgia courts is impossible to
determine.
VI. MECHANIC'S AND MATERIALMAN'S LIENS
A.

Lien Waivers and Liberalization

Of all the developments in the field of construction law during the survey period, few are as significant as the changes made by the General
Assembly with regard to the enforceability of mechanic's and materialman's liens. Notwithstanding the dramatic changes made by the Georgia
courts, the most significant change to occur in the mechanic's and materi113. 201 Ga. App. at 638, 411 S.E.2d at 886.
114. Id. (citing City of Buford v. Thomas, 179 Ga. App. 769, 772, 347 S.E.2d 713 (1986)).
115. Also of interest is a decision in the Northern District of Georgia holding that an
arbitrator's refusal to postpone arbitration pending resolution of administrative proceedings

was not unreasonable. See Ceco Concrete Constr., Div. of Robertson-Ceco Corp. v. J.T.
Schrimsher Constr. Co., 792 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
116. Ex Parte Williams, 591 So. 2d 71 (Ala. 1991).
117. 591 So. 2d 71 (Ala. 1991).

118. Id. at 71.
119. Id. at 72.
120. Id. at 73.
121. Henderson Inv. Corp. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991).
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alman's liens statutory framework has been the institution as of January
1, 1992 of Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 44-14366.122 O.C.G.A. section 44-14-366 makes several significant changes in
the ability or right of individuals to waive claims of lien. O.C.G.A. section
44-14-366(a) states the following:
[a] right to claim a lien or to claim upon a bond may not be waived in
advance of furnishing of labor, services or materials. Any purported
waiver or release of lien or bond claim or of this code section executed or
made in advance of furnishing of labor, services, or materials is null,
void, and unenforceable.2
This section will dramatically affect construction planning, because no
longer may a contractor or property owner rely upon a blanket lien.waiver
in the original contract. Instead, each contractor or subcontractor must be
dealt with on an individual basis in order to avoid having a lien placed on
the property subsequent to the completion of the contract. This modification will greatly increase the protection afforded potential lien claimants
and minimize the ability of construction contractors and property owners
to protect themselves by a'blanket assertion of a waiver in the initial con122. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-366 (Supp. 1992). Several other aspects of the materialman's lien
statutory framework have been modified. The two most significant changes involved the
ability to recover rental values and the notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1 (Supp.
1992). First, O.C.G.A. § 44-14-360 (Supp. 1992) has been changed to allow the lien claimant
the reasonable rental value or the actual rental cost, whichever is greater. Id. Before, the
lien claimant was entitled only to pursue the claim for the reasonable rental value of the
equipment. This change prevents a lien claimant from absorbing a loss merely because he
had to pursue a lien claim rather than being paid outright by the contractor. O.C.G.A. § 4414-361.1 has been modified in two ways. First, a party is now required at the time of filing
for record of this claim of a lien a certified copy must be sent to the owner of the property
or the contractor involved. O.C.G.A. §.44-14-361.1(a)(2),(1992). Also, O.C.G.A. § 44-14361.1(a)(3) has been modified to state that after the commencement of an action, lien notice
must be filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court within 14 days. Id. Previously, the statutory language had required the lien notice to be filed at the time of the filing of such action.
Accordingly, lien claimants now are allowed a 14 day window within which to get the papers
filed. Accordingly, the contractor or lien claimant is now left with a more black and white
determination of when notice of a lien may be filed. No longer is it left to the vagaries of the
court using a reasonable standard. See American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Starline Mfg. Corp.,
171 Ga. App. 790, 320 S.E.2d 857 (1984).
123. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-366(a) (1992). The changes made by the code section are significant. Now the law prevents a lien claimant from being unfairly deprived of the materials
and labor furnished, because he was forced at the time he accepted the bid for the contracting job to waive all potential claims against either the general contractor or the property owner. This has been standard practice in the industry for some years to require a
waiver of lien notice in the contract in order to avoid attachments to the contractor or the
owner's property. DAVID F. HINKEL, GEORGIA CONSTRUCTION MECHANICS' & MATERIALMEN'S
LIENS § 14-3(c) (1981 & Supp. 1991).
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tract or subcontract.124 Notably, this modification is in keeping with the
sympathies of many jurors when confronted with a question of a possible
lien waiver.125
Further, O.C.G.A. section 44-14-366 codifies the common law by invalidating all oral waivers of a mechanic's lien. 26 Also, the section puts 12in
place new requirements that must be met before an estoppel is valid. 7
For a waiver or estoppel to be effective, the following conditions must be
met under the new section: (1) a written waiver and release similar to the
one provided for in the new section must be executed; and (2) the claimant must be paid for the claim.12 The section goes on to state that a lien
claim is paid in full upon:
the earliest of: (A) Actual receipt of funds; (B) Execution by the claimant
of a separate written acknowledgment of payment in full; or (C) Thirty
[30] days after the date of execution of the waiver and release, unless
prior expiration of said [thirty] 30 day period the claimant files a claim
of lien or files in the county in which the property is located an Affidavit
of Non payment ....21
Additionally, the section states that "[niothing in this Code section shall
shorten the time within which to file a claim of lien."1 0
The effect of this provision is to require that a lien claimant is paid in
full for the services and materials rendered. Again, similar to previous
modifications of the statutory scheme, this change will improve the ability of lien claimants to obtain payment for their materials and services.
Construction contractors and property owners now must be extremely
careful in releasing liens to insure that liens cannot be filed against their
property.
Generally, because materialman's liens statutes are in derogation of the
common law and often require innocent parties to pay the debt secured
by the lien, Georgia courts have strictly construed the provisions of the
Georgia Code against lien claimants.' 1 As noted in last year's survey,
124. The pursuit of these blanket waivers has been an industry practice utilized with
significant results against unsophisticated contractors or subcontractors. The effect of this
code provision will be to level the playing field. For a discussion of lien waivers in construction planning, see Hinkel, supra note 123, § 14-3(c).
125. See, e.g., Schwan's Sales Enter., Inc. v. Martin Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 202
Ga. App. 510, 414 S.E.2d 727 (1992).
126. O.C.G.A. § 44.14-366 (Supp. 1992).
127. Id. § 44-14-366(b).
128. Id. See O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-366(c) to -366(d) for copies of the necessary forms for the
filing of these waivers. Id. §§ 44-14-366(c) to -366(d).
129. Id. § 44-14-366(f)(2).
130. Id. § 44-14-366(f)(4).
131. See, e.g., Star Mfg. Co. v. Edenfield, 191 Ga. App. 665, 382 S.E.2d 706 (1989);
Brockett Rd. Apartments v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 138 Ga. App. 198, 225 S.E.2d 771 (1976).
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Georgia courts tend to place the materialman's lien under a magnifying
glass to examine whether or not the filing of the lien complied with the
statutory requirements found in O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.1(a).1 32 This
trend to microscopically examine each lien claim may be changing as the
court of appeals becomes more comfortable with the purpose and principles behind mechanic's and materialman's liens. While the courts will still
not tolerate untimely filings of liens, they have softened in their approach
in dealing with technical irregularities in the lien. Whereas in the past
Georgia courts have almost exclusively looked at the form and not the
function of the lien, the courts now have begun a trend of looking at the
purpose and function of a lien.
For example, in Summit-Top Development, Inc. v. Williamson Construction, Inc.,1 8 the court of appeals upheld a partial verdict in favor of
1
a materialman who had originally filed an inaccurate initial lien. 3 Summit-Top Development, Inc. ("Summit-Top"), the developers of a housing
subdivision, hired Williamson Construction, Inc. ("Williamson") for grading, clearing, and installing a sewer system beginning in March 1988.
Summit-Top paid monthly bills for this work until it refused to pay an
invoice for the blasting and removal of a large mass of rock. A second
invoice on September 24, 1988 likewise remained unpaid. The parties attempted and failed at an informal resolution."' 8
Following a heated exchange, a Summit-Top principal ordered that
Williamson remove its equipment from the worksite. The principal further demonstrated to-Williamson that Summit-Top could not pay Williamson for the supplies and services. Williamson pulled out without completing the contract.18 6
After ceasing work, Williamson filed a claim of lien against the corporate property for $394,460.70, the total of the unpaid bills. Subsequently,
Williamson instituted suit on the lien. During litigation, it became apparent that the lien amount included charges for work which Williamson had
not performed. Accordingly, Williamson filed a release of lien removing
$47,421.62 from the lien. The case proceeded to a jury trial and a verdict
was returned for the lien amount, attorney fees, and prejudgment
interest. 87

See also Bryan J. Morrissey & Kyle Woods, Construction Law, 42 MERCER L. REv.25, 39
(1990).
132. Morrissey & Wallace, supra note 1, at 162; O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1 (Supp. 1992).
133. 203 Ga. App. 460, 416 S.E.2d 889 (1992).
134. Id. at 461-62, 416 S.E.2d at 890-91.
135. Id. at 460-61, 416 S.E.2d at 890.
136. Id. at 462-63, 416 S.E.2d at 891.
137. Id. at 461, 416 S.E.2d at 890.
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Summit-Top appealed the verdict claiming that the trial court had
erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict. 3 6 Summit-Top enumerated two errors in the trial court's refusal of a directed verdict. First,
the claim of lien by virtue of its incorrect filing was void and unenforceable.13 ' Second, since Williamson abandoned its contract, it could not
"demonstrate substantial compliance with the contract in order to en0
force its lien pursuant to O.C.G.A. Section 44-14-361.1(a)(1)."1
The first enumeration of error attempted to rely on the principle that
41
statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed.
With regard to materialman's liens, this principle has been codified at
0.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.1(a), which states that: "[t]o make good the
liens specified ..

,

they must be created and declared in accordance with

the following provisions, and on failure of any of them, the liens shall not
be effective or enforceable . . . . 1,4 Summit-Top attempted to stretch
the boundaries of this doctrine by arguing that Williamson's filing of an
inaccurate lien amount invalidated the entire claim of the lien." ' Specifically, Summit-Top claimed that Williamson:
deliberately included erroneous charges in the lien and could not establish at trial how the amount discharged from the lien was determined;
therefore ...

[Williamson] can not rely on an exception to the lien stat-

utes which allows easily separable nonlienable items to be omitted from a
lien and still preserve the lien."
The court of appeals summarily dismissed this argument because Williamson had prepared the invoices supporting the lien according to Summit-Top's instructions." 34 Thus, the trial court properly denied Summit6
Top's motion for a directed verdict.'
138. Id. Summit-Top also attempted unsuccessfully to appeal the verdict of personal
liability against the shareholders of Summit-Top. The court upheld the verdict against the
individuals concluding that the principals "are involved in a pattern of practice wherein the

corporate entity is a mere instrumentality to evade contractual responsibility in that [Williamson] is now a victim of that course of conduct." Id. at 464, 416 S.E.2d at 892. Therefore,
the verdict against the individual was upheld. Id.
139. Id. at 461-62, 416 S.E.2d at 890.
140. Id. at 462, 416 S.E.2d at 891.

141. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
142. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a) (Supp. 1992). Normally, this principle is used to invalidate liens which are not filed in strict conformance with the statutory scheme. See, e.g.,
Atlanta Jewish Community Ctr., Inc. v. Tom Barrow Co., 130 Ga. App. 608, 203 S.E.2d 921
(1974).
143. 203 Ga. App. at 461-62, 416 S.E.2d at 890.
144. Id. at 461, 416 S.E.2d at 890 (citing Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Superior Rigging Co.,
120 Ga. App. 412(4), 170 S.E.2d 721 (1969)).
145. Id. at 462, 416 S.E.2d at 891.

146. Id.
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Summit-Top's second enumeration of error was also shot down by the
court of appeals. 4 7 Summit-Top contended that by abandoning the work,
Williamson had failed to substantially comply with the contract.1 48 Substantial compliance with the contract is usually a prerequisite to creating
a valid materialman's lien.1 4 ' This requirement is waived if the contractor
prevents completion of the contract."50 In the instant case, Summit-Top
relied upon the court of appeals holding in MacLeod v. Belvedale, Inc.,'
which stated the following: "abandonment of the work before compliance
with the contract, upon a mere apprehension that he will not be paid at
the time for payment, is unauthorized and defeats the contractor's claim
of lien.' 52 The court summarily dismissed this contention citing two incidents, in which Summit-Top had told Williamson to leave the property
and informed Williamson that it would not be paid."1 3 The court stated
that "[t]he foregoing evidence supports a finding that [Williamson] was
prevented from completing the job by appellants' actions; therefore, (Williamson's] cessation of work was not an abandonment of the contract.""' 4
As is apparent in the decision in Summit-Top, the court of appeals has
not strictly construed the lien requirements, but has reasonably construed
the lien requirements. This tinkering with the statutory scheme has the
net effect of furthering the remedial purpose of the materialman's lien
statutes and providing for a greater degree of protection to the lien
claimant.
This liberalizing trend was again featured in Abacus, Inc. v. Hebron
Baptist Church, Inc."' The court of appeals in Abacus liberally interpreted the reasonable notice provisions contained in O.C.G.A. section 4414-361.1, by validating a materialman's lien that was filed after the twelve
month period for commencing an action."'5 Abacus brought an action to
foreclose a materialman's lien against the church's property. Abacus delivered the materials to the contractor to improve the church's property
and the bill became due on August 22, 1988. Abacus filed its claim of lien
on November 10, 1988. On August 15, 1989, within the twelve month period, Abacus brought suit against the contractor to perfect the lien. Fol147.
148.
149.
codified
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 462-63, 416 S.E.2d at 891.
Id. at 462, 416 S.E.2d at 891.
See, e.g., Jones v. Ely, 95 Ga. App. 4, 96 S.E.2d 536 (1957). The principle has been
at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(1) (Supp. 1992).
See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Hollis, 167 Ga. App. 48, 305 S.E.2d 864 (1983).
115 Ga. App. 444, 154 S.E.2d 756 (1967).
Id. at 445, 154 S.E.2d at 759.
203 Ga. App. at 462-63, 416 S.E.2d at 891-92.
Id. at 463, 416 S.E.2d at 891.
201 Ga. App. 376, 411 S.E.2d 113 (1991).
Id. at 377, 411 S.E.2d at 114-15.
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lowing that, on August 30, 1989, Abacus filed a notice of suit in Gwinnett
County, where the property was located. 7
The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings because the notice of
the suit was not timely filed under O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.1.158 The

trial court reasoned that "the present notice was untimely filed under the
statute because it was filed eight days after the [twelve] month period for
filing suit had expired .

. . ."1

In considering the problem, the court of

appeals looked at the 1989 statute, but took cognizance and legislative
intent from the 1991 amendment discussed above. 160
Note that this liberalizing trend does not extend so far as to change the
basis of the statutory scheme with regard to filing. The filing of an imperfect notice or late notice of a lien is still a defense to any potential lien
claims. For example, in Consolidated Systems, Inc. v. AMISUB Inc., 1
the supreme court on reconsideration again reiterated the holding that
"the filing of an imperfect notice does render the lien unenforceable
"162

B. Parties Subject to Lien
In two interesting and significant decisions under the Georgia materialman's lien statutes during the survey period, the court of appeals drafted
opinions that attempted to explain which parties are subject to a lien
claim. The net effect of these decisions is to broaden the applicability of
the materialman's lien statutes. This further increases the likelihood that
a material supplier will have a legal remedy againstthe property owner or
lessor if he is not paid for the materials supplied. The court of appeals in
Benning Construction Co. v. Dykes Paving & Construction Co., 1'3 affirmed a judgment in favor of the lien claimant against the construction
company and its surety.'" General contractor Benning entered into an
agreement with an owner for construction of an office and warehouse facility. Benning in turn subcontracted with Scarboro Paving to furnish
materials and labor, to install paving, and to complete the gutter and
curb work. The subcontract prohibited assignment or transfer of the work
157. Id. at 376, 411 S.E.2d at 114.
158. Id.
159. Id. (Compare with American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Starline Mfg. Corp., 171 Ga.
App. 790, 320 S.E.2d 857 (1984)).
160. Id. at 377, 411 S.E.2d at 115. See supra text accompanying notes 127-32.
161. 261 Ga. 590, 408 S.E.2d 109 (1991).
162. Id. at 591, 408 S.E.2d at 110. See also Duncan Wholesale v. Palmer, 92 F.C.D.R.
545. Another "liberal" trend case is Bowers v. Howell, 203 Ga. App. 636, 417 S.E.2d 392
(1992).
163. 204 Ga. App. 73, 418 S.E.2d 620 (1992).
164. Id. at 74-75, 418 S.E.2d at 621-22.
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without consent of the primary contractor. Nonetheless, Scarboro contracted with Lanier Paving Company to install the asphalt without the
contractor's knowledge. Lanier in turn ordered the asphalt material for
the project from Dykes Paving, defendant, and entered into a joint payment agreement involving plaintiff, Scarboro, and Lanier. Plaintiff in the
action timely delivered the asphalt, which was installed by Lanier. Both
Scarboro and Benning were on site and knew that Lanier had supplied
the labor and equipment on the project. The property owner rejected the
installation of the parking lot and demanded that it be corrected. When
Scarboro refused to correct the installation,. Benning, the primary contractor, paid another subcontractor to resurface the area. Plaintiff supplied the asphalt material to the second contractor.iB
Plaintiff never received payment for the material delivered to Lanier
and attempted to obtain payment for the asphalt from Benning. Benning
initially refused stating that the asphalt had not been supplied by plaintiff and that it did not comport with the contract requirements. In response, plaintiff provided the primary contractor with proof that the
asphalt had been delivered and engineering test results, which showed
that the asphalt complied with the grade requirements specified in the
contract. Nonetheless, the primary contractor continued to refuse payment. Plaintiff timely notified the owner and filed the materialman's lien
for $10,747.72, the cost of the asphalt. Shortly, thereafter, Lanier declared
16
bankruptcy.
Following the breakdown of negotiations between the parties, a suit
was filed and tried. During the trial, the primary contractor made a motion for a directed verdict because "plaintiff was merely a supplier of
materials to a supplier and was not entitled to a claim of lien as a matter
of law because it neither supplied to a contractually authorized subcontractor nor had a contractual relationship with the owner.""'7 The defendant timely appealed the refusal to grant a directed verdict.1" In considering the problem, the court of appeals examined the statutory
definition of subcontractor as defined by O.C.G.A. section 44-14361(a)(2), which "provides that all materialmen furnishing material to
subcontractor shall have a special lien on the real estate for which they
furnish labor, services or material."... The court went on to note that
"[b]y statutory definition, the 'subcontractor' means, but is not limited

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
621.

Id. at 74, 418 S.E.2d at 620-21.
Id., 418 S.E.2d at 621.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361(a)(2) (Supp. 1992). See 204 Ga. App. at 74-75, 418 S.E.2d at
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to, subcontractors having privity of contract with the contractor."'1 0 The

court stated the following:
Although Lanier was 'a second tier subcontractor having no privity of
contract with Benning, it nevertheless was a "subcontractor" within the
definition of the lien statute. As the supplier of material "used in making
improvements to the real estate" for the benefit of the owner or a sub-'
contractor, plaintiff was authorized by law to attach a lien on 7the property to the extent of the "reasonable value" of that material. 1

The court went on to note that "[e]ven if Scarboro breached its contract
with Benning by subcontracting with Lanier without Benning's consent,
this would not destroy the privity of contract or prevent or defeat the
statutory lien. 17 2 The court of appeals acknowledged the interest of the
subcontractor who had supplied the materials, and interpreted the statute in such a way to insure that-the supplier of materials is paid for any
money they are out. This is in keeping with the general trend to liberalize
the mechanic's and materialman's lien statutory framework in favor of
173
the supplier of materials.
. This liberalizing trend that runs throughout the survey period does not
extend to all cases involving privity. In a fascinating opinion, the court of
appeals affirmed a summary judgment dismissal of a claim, because the
lien claimant did not have sufficient privity of contract with the sublessee
of the property. 17 4 In D & N Electric, Inc. v. Underground Festival,
Inc. ' 7 the court upheld a summary judgment dismissal against a lien
claimant, because the lien claimant did not have privity of contract with
7
the person who ordered the construction work done.7'
Defendant, Underground Festival, owned a fifty year lease on property from which it sublet
a portion to the B. Gallery Group, Inc. ("BGGI"). This sublease provided
that prior to the commencement of the lease term, BGGI would have certain improvements made on the property and that in consideration for
these improvements, BGGI would receive an allowance from defendant
toward the costs of the improvement work. Payment of this allowance
was to be made within sixty calendar days after the execution of lien
waivers from those individuals that made improvements on BGGI's lease170.
171.
heavily
(1988).
172.
173.
174.
(1991).
175.
176.

204 Ga. App. at 74-75, 418 S.E.2d at 621. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-360(9).
204 Ga. App. at 74-75, 418 S.E.2d at 621. In reaching this decision, the court relied
on the opinion in Tonn & Blank v. D.M. Asphalt, 187 Ga. App. 272, 370 S.E.2d 30
204 Ga. App. at 75, 418 S.E.2d at 621.
See supra text accompanying notes 122-62.
D & N Elec., Inc. v. Underground Festival, Inc., 202 Ga. App. 435, 414 S.E.2d 891
202 Ga. App. 435, 414 S.E.2d 891 (1991).
Id. at 438-39, 414 S.E.2d at 893-94.
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hold., D & N Electric performed certain work in connection with these
improvements on the property and was not paid. Subsequently, it filed its
claim of lien and instituted foreclosure action. 77
Following discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of Underground Festival and the lien claimant appealed.' 7 In ruling, the
court of appeals dealt with several issues.17 9 The first was the nature of
the interest held by Underground Festival in the property. The court
quickly noted that "[n]either the existence nor the status of owner of the
reversionary interest in the property is relevant to the resolution of the
instant appeal." 1 0 The court concluded that since Underground Festival
held a fifty year lease in the property and it was sublessor to BGGI, Underground Festival was a "true owner" against whose interest a materialman's lien could attach.'" The court noted that a "'lien [authorized by
O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361] may attach to the interest of a lessee [-sublessor) who has an estate for years in the demised premises, subject to the
conditions of the lease.'

"182

Next, the court determined that the relationship between the sublessor
and the sublessee was sufficient to allow a materialman's lien to be filed
against Underground Festival."" The court quickly dispensed with the
privity problem stating the following:
[slince the evidence of record would authorize a finding that [Underground Festival) had consented to such of BGGI's contracts as related to
the contemplated improvements of the property, the lack of any immediate contract between [Underground Festival] and those with whom
BGGI had contracted in connection with those improvements would not
be a viable basis for the grant of summary judgment in favor of [Underground Festival]. ' $"
After resolving each of these issues in favor of the lien claimant, the
court of appeals, the judicial equivalent of a deus ex machina, reversed
itself and held in favor of Underground Festival. 188 The rationale for this
holding stems from a failure of privity of contract between the lien claim177. Id. at 435-36, 414 S.E.2d at 891-92.
178. Id. -at 436, 414 S.E.2d at 892.
179. Id. at 436-39, 414 S.E.2d at 892-94.
180. Id. at 436, 414 S.E.2d at 892.
181. Id. (citing Bennett Ironworks v. Underground Atlanta, 130 Ga. App. 653(l), 204
S.E.2d 331 (1974)).
182. Id. (quoting James G. Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Chamberlain-Johnson-Dubose Co., 140
Ga. 593, 79 S.E. 465 (1913)).
183. Id. at 436-37, 414 S.E.2d at 892-93.
184. Id. at 437, 414 S.E.2d at 893.
185. Id. at 438-39, 414 'S.E.2d at 893-94.
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ant and BGGI. 890 The court found that "unless there was contractual
privity between [D & N Electric] and BGGI, [D & N Electric] can have
no enforceable lien against appellee's interest in the property."' 87 The
court stated the following:
"There need-be no contract between the materialman and the true
owner, but there must be a contract for material with a person who has
contracted with the true owner for the erection of the improvements. A
contract is necessary to fix the liability of the owner and establish a privity between him and the materialman. A stranger may not order work
done upon real estate and thus charge the true owner ....
This privity problem represented the fatal flaw in the lien claimant's
action. As the court noted, D & N Electric did not "base its claim upon a
contract with BGGI. Instead, [D & N Electric] asserts that its contract
was with an individual named Phillip Brock 'd/b/a B. Gallery.' " 89 Further, D & N Electric presented no evidence about any connection between Brock and BGGI. The court of appeals, however, was willing to
assume that Mr. Brock was a corporate officer and had the authority to
bind B. Gallery.19 0 The court noted that even if the assumption was
made, the lien claimant failed to comply with O.C.G.A. section 44-14361.1(a)(3) because it failed to file suit against him individually.' 9' The
court therefore concluded:
[i]f Brock, in his corporate capacity, was otherwise authorized to contract
on behalf of BGGI for the improvements on the property so as to charge
[Underground Festival] the costs thereof [D & N Electric's] failure to
bring suit against BGGI. in compliance with O.C.G.A. [section] 44-14361.1(a)(3) nevertheless
mandates the- grant of summary judgment in
12
favor of appellee.

Accordingly, the liberal trend that has been discussed in this section of
the survey did not extend to a situation in which a corporate veil needed
to be pierced to reach a result in favor of the lien claimant. When a party
files its initial claim 'for a lien, it must be certain as to exactly against
whom the lien needs to be filed. The corporate identity needs to be correctly determined in order to avoid compromising the lien claim.
186.
187.
188.
S.E.2d
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 438, 414 S.E.2d at 894.
Id.
Id. at 438-39, 414 S.E.2d at 894 (quoting Marshall v. Peacock, 205 Ga. 891, 893, 55
354, 357 (1949)).
Id. at 439, 414 S.E.2d at 894.
Id.
Id. Accordingly, the time to file the lien against the individual had elapsed.
Id.
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C. Claims and Attorney Fees
In several unusual cases, the court of appeals changed or clarified aspects of the materialman's lien statutory framework. In two cases, the
court of appeals clarified what represented a jury question in a lien foreclosure action. The court in Schwann's Sales Enterprises,Inc. v. Martin
Mechanical Contractors, Inc.,' 83 held that a jury question existed as to
when a furnishing of labor or materials occurred in order to determine
whether the lien was timely filed.'" In Schwann the lien claim would only
be timely filed if the jury found that a single call by the defendant to the
subcontractor for help on installing a gas pump constituted a furnishing
of goods and services under the contract, and therefore allowed the claim
of lien to be timely filed. The claimant sent an electrician to the property
where he found an employee of the gas company working on the gas
pump. He assisted in getting the gas pump operational again. 105 The
court noted that the "evidence is not conclusive regarding whether the
electrician's response to defendant's request for help to .make the gas
pump operational should be considered work necessary for completion of
subcontractor's contract with Mid-Mo [a general contractor]." 1 " The
court believed this created a jury issue.1 ' The court went on to note that
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict in favor of there
being a valid and enforceable lien and upheld their verdict.'"
The court of appeals also found a jury question as to the amount of the
lien in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints v.Allied Ready Mix, Inc.'" The court in
Allied Ready Mix reversed a summary judgment in favor of the lien
claimant, because there was a question of fact as to whether the owner
was entitled to credit for amounts he had allegedly paid to the primary
contractor2 00 In a brief opinion, the court of appeals noted that the affidavit filed by the contractor stating that he had paid directly to the suppliers and materialman an amount equal to that paid by the owner to the
contractor represented a question of fact as to the exact value of the ma193. 202 Ga. App. 510, 414 S.E.2d 727 (1992).
194. Id. at 511, 414 SE.2d at 728.
195. Id. at 510, 414 S.E.2d at 727.
196. Id., 414 S.E.2d at 727-28.
197. Id. at 511, 414 S.E.2d at 728.
198. Id. This case contrasts with the case of Womack Indus. v. B & A Equip. Co., 199
Ga. App. 660, 405 S.E.2d 880 (1991). For discussion of Womack Indus. v. B & A Equip., see
Morrisey & Wallace, supra note 1, at 163-64.
199. 201 Ga. App. 873, 412 S.E.2d 622 (1991).
200. Id. at 874-75, 412 S.E.2d at 623-24.
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terialman's lien making summary judgment improper.2 0 ' The court of appeals noted the following:
[elven if this evidence may not have been sufficient to authorize the
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Owner, construing it most
favorably for the Owner as the non-moving party, it was certainly sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact so
as to preclude the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
202
Materialman.
In a fascinating case, the court of appeals clarified the role a materialman's lien would play between property owners and contractors. 203 Fuji
Vegetable Oil, Inc. ("Fuji") engaged Chiyoda International ("Chiyoda")
as a general contractor for construction of a vegetable oil refining plant
on property owned by Georgia Ports Authority. Chiyoda hired' Grady
Sturgess Builder, Inc. ("Sturgess") as a subcontractor on the project.
Sturgess defaulted on its contract and even though it had been paid by
Chiyoda, it did not pay the materialmen and other lien claimants with
claims in excess of $540,000. In the contract between Fuji and Chiyoda,
Chiyoda agreed to pay and satisfy all claims for labor and materials for
20
any worked performed under the contract. '
Fuji called upon Chiyoda to discharge the liens, but Chiyoda refused,
claiming that Fuji had a "non-lienable possessory interest." Accordingly,
a dispute existed as to whether Georgia Ports Authority's property was a
lienable estate, and that Chiyoda was not under any contractual obligation to satisfy the liens. Chiyoda filed a declaratory judgment action. Following discovery, Chiyoda successfully moved for summary judgment on
the theory that the claims were invalid. Hoffman Electric and twenty-one
other material suppliers appealed the court's judgment to the court of
205
appeals.
In a surprising opinion, the court of appeals declined to address the
issue of whether Georgia Ports Authority's property was a lienable estate,
because the nature of the obligation between Chiyoda and Fuji was contractual.20 6 The dispute was not necessarily a question to be decided by
the materialman's lien statutory framework. 2 0 7 The court noted that
Chiyoda's assertion that "Fuji's estate is not lienable would not, even if
true, relieve the appellee of its liability under the terms of its agreement
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id. at 875, 412 S.E.2d at 623-24.
Hoffman Elec. Co. v. Chiyoda Int'l Corp., 203 Ga. App. 731, 417 S.E.2d 371 (1992).
Id. at 731-32, 417 S.E.2d at 371-72.
Id. at 732, 417 S.E.2d at 372.
Id. at 732-33, 417 S.E.2d at 372.
Id.
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with Fuji both to remove liens and discharge the underlying claims on
which they are predicated. 08
Accordingly, the court of appeals found that the Chiyoda question regarding the use of the usufruct in the nonlienable interest held by Fuji
was not addressed with regard to the materialman's liens statute.2 0 9
Proper drafting of the contract by the representatives of Fuji successfully
prevented the assertion of a defense by Chiyoda and led to greater certainty in the contracting process.
Finally, two remedial aspects of the materialman's lien statutory framework were clarified by the court of appeals during the survey. The court
'
in Turner Construction Co. v.Electrical Distributors,Inc.,21'
held that a
supplier of materials was entitled to prejudgment interest at the statutory
rate." Electrical Distributors, Inc. ("EDI"), a supplier to a subcontractor
on a large commercial construction project, successfully brought suit on a
lien bond against Turner Construction Company ("Turner").2 12 On remittitur, the trial court entered a judgment for EDI in the principal amount
of $117,538.58 and interest calculated at eighteen percent per annum
from the date the obligation became due. Turner and the surety appealed
the award of prejudgment interest.1 1 The only issue on appeal was Turner's contention that since the lien statutes do not expressly provide for
21
an order of prejudgment interest, the trial court's ruling was invalid. '
The court of appeals relied on the supreme court's decision in Horkan v.
Great American Indemnity Co.,' 15 which awarded the prejudgment interest at the liquidated damage rate of seven percent.2 " The court felt
bound by the Horkan decision and thus awarded a grant of prejudgment
217
interest in favor of the lien claimant.
Turner also contended that the statutory limit for interest would be the
seven percent in the statute, not the eighteen percent that was in the bill
of sale issued by EDI. The court held that the statutory authorization to
charge interest on commercial accounts does not apply in the instant
case, because the materials supplied by EDI went to a subcontractor, not
to Turner itself." s Accordingly, the court of appeals summarily threw out
208. Id. at 732, 417 S.E.2d at 372.
209. Id. at 732-33, 417 S.E.2d at 372.
210. 202 Ga. App. 726, 415 S.E.2d 325 (1992).
211. Id. at 726-27, 415 S.E.2d at 326.
212, Id. at 726, 415 S.E.2d at 326. See Electrical Distribs. v. Turner Constr. Co., 196 Ga.
App. 359, 395 S.E.2d 879 (1990).
213. 202 Ga. App. at 726, 415 S.E.2d at 326.
214. Id. at 726-27, 415 S.E.2d at 326.
215. 211 Ga. 690, 88 S.E.2d 13 (1955).
216. Id. at 691, 88 S.E.2d at 14.
217. 202 Ga. App. at 726-27, 415 S.E.2d at 326.
218. Id. at 727, 415 S.E.2d at 326.
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the eighteen percent interest levied against Turner.2" The court noted
that Turner's "liability does not arise out of their failure to pay any
amounts they owed to [EDI] on a commercial account and O.C.G.A. [section] 7-4-16 thus is not applicable. ' 22 0 The court of appeals affirmed the
decision to grant interest but reduced the liquidated damages amount to
seven percent.2 21 Prejudgment interest should be requested on all material lien claims in order to maximize recovery on behalf of the lien claimants. In most cases, however, the lien claimant will be limited to the statutory prejudgment interest amount and cannot modify that amount by
contract or agreement.
The court of appeals also clarified that attorney fees are not available
for lien claimants. The court in Benning Construction Co. v. Dykes Paving & Construction Co.,222 stated that attorney fees were not recoverable
in lien claim actions. 22 3 The court noted that "'attorney fees are recoverable only when authorized by some statutory provision or by contract.' ,,24*Absent a specific provision in the materialman's statute allowing the reward of attorney fees, a lien claimant cannot make a claim
for attorney fees unless he is in direct contractual privity with the person
with whom he supplied the materials and the contract supports such a
claim. In Benning the court dismissed the attorney fees portion of the
claim noting that the failure to establish a contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant is fatal
to any and all claims for attorney
22 5
fees made by the lien claimant.
During the survey period, the court of appeals and the General Assembly made significant changes in the statutory scheme allowing for the filing and recovery of materialman's lien. While there has been a certain
and identifiable trend to provide a greater chance for the recovery by lien
claimants of the cost they have expended in providing materials, the lien
statute still requires exacting and specific attention to the timely filing
requirement contained in O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.1. Contractors
should pay specific attention to the new provision, which makes the waiving of lien claims prior to the supply of the material invalid. This liberalization of the lien claim rules furthers the policies in the materialman's
lien statutes and will in all likelihood continue as the Georgia courts be219. Id., 415 S.E.2d at 327.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 204 Ga. App. 73, 418 S.E.2d 620 (1992). See supra.text accompanying notes 163-73.
For a discussion of subcontracting and lien claims, see supra text accompanying notes 16392.
223. 204 Ga. App. at 76, 418 S.E.2d at 622.
224. Id.(citing Glynn County Fed. Credit Union v. Peagler, 256 Ga. 342, 348 S.E.2d 628
(1986)).

225. Id.
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come increasingly familiar with the function of materialman's liens over
the form.
VII. SURETY, BOND, AND GUARANTOR ISSUES
A.

Public Works Bonds

Failure of Public Works Owner to Require Bond. Generally
speaking, a public owner is required by law to require from the entities
with whom it contracts to perform a construction payment and performance bonds.2 " For example, in City of Atlanta v. United Electric Co.,227
the City of Atlanta and the Downtown Development Authority of the
City of Atlanta (collectively "the City") appealed the grant of summary
judgment to plaintiff United Electric Company, which had asserted a
claim against them for the failure to require a payment bond of the gen226. For public work contracts exceeding $40,000, O.C.G.A. § 13-10-1(b) (Supp. 1992)
provides as follows:
No contract with this state, a county, a municipal corporation, or any public board
or body thereof, for the doing of any public work shall be valid for any purpose,
unless the contractor shall give:
(1) A performance bond with good and sufficient surety or sureties payable
to, in favor of, and for the protection of the state, county, municipal corporation, or public board or body thereof for which the work is to be done.
The performance bond shall be in the amount of at least the total amount
payable by the terms of the contrqct. This bond shall not be required when
a bond is required under Code Section 36-10-4;
(2)(A) A payment bond with good and sufficient surety or sureties, payable
to the state, county, municipal corporation, or public board or body thereof
for which the work is to be done, and for the use and protection of all
subcontractors and all persons supplying labor, materials, machinery, and
equipment in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract. The
payment bond shall be in the amount of at least the total amount payable
by the terms of the contract.
Id. In lieu of a payment bond, the contracting entity may post a cashier's check, certified
check or cash for that amount with the public owner. O.C.G.A. § 13-10-1(b)(2)(B) (Supp.
1992). Furthermore, "No contract with this state or with a county, municipal corporation, or
any other public board or body thereof for the doing of any public work shall be valid for
any purpose unless the contractor shall comply with Code Section 13-10-1." O.C.G.A. § 3682-101 (1987). O.C.G.A. § 36-82-102 (1987) provides in pertinent part:
. . . If the payment bond or security deposit required in paragraph (2)(b) of Code
Section 13-10-1, together with affidavit when necessary, is not taken in the manner and form required in this Code section, the corporation or body for which the
work is done under the contract shall be liable to all subcontractors and to all
persons furnishing labor, skills, tools, machinery, or materials to the contractor or
subcontractor thereunder for any loss resulting to them from such failure . ...
Id. A "subcontractor" includes "but is not limited to those having privity of contract with
the prime contractor." O.C.G.A. § 36-82-100 (1987).
227. 202 Ga. App. 239, 414 S.E.2d 251 (1991).
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eral contractor performing work in Underground Atlanta. The City contended that Underground Atlanta was not a public works project as contemplated under the statute and therefore no payment bond was
22 8
required.

Defendants were participants in the Underground Atlanta project and
had entered into an agreement with Underground Festival, Inc., to construct and operate the project. Underground Festival, Inc., separately.
contracted for the construction of the exterior shell of the project and
payment and performance bonds were required for that aspect of the project. Furthermore, Underground Festival, Inc., had agreed to complete
the commercial facilities within the project itself, and in one such facility,
the tenant, using a tenant allowance provided by Underground Festival
Project, Inc., contracted with a general contractor to construct the interior of the facility. The contractor subcontracted with plaintiff United
Electric Company to provide materials and services on the project. The
general contractor on this particular aspect of the construction was not
required by Underground Festival, Inc., to provide payment and performance bonds. The general contractor failed to pay United Electric Company for its work on the project and eventually declared bankruptcy. 22'
The court of appeals found that the project was constructed by the
Downtown Development Authority under the Downtown Development
Act.2 8 The "totality of the -agreements" between the City and Underground Festival, Inc., showed that the project itself was contemplated as
a public works project.2 3 ' In failing to require a payment and performance

bond in accordance with the law, United Electric Company, Inc., acquired
''
a "direct right of action to recover any resulting

1o5s.

211

Timely Notice. In Southern Steel Co. v. United Pacific Insurance

Co. ,s2 Southern Steel Company sued United Pacific Insurance Company,

a surety, on a payment bond placed by the general contractor, Noonan
Kellos, Inc., for construction of the Cobb County jail. The general contractor had hired Roanoke Iron and Bridgeworks, Inc., as a subcontractor
to supply and install the detention equipment in the jail. The subcontractor in turn hired Southern Steel to supply various locking devices and
other hardware. The last of the materials shipped by Southern Steel to
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 239, 414 S.E.2d at 252.
Id. at 239-40, 414 S.E.2d at 252.
O.C.G.A. §§ 36-42-1 to -16 (1987 & Supp. 1992).
202 Ga. App. at 240, 414 S.E.2d at 252-53. See O.C.G.A. § 36-42-3(6) (Supp. 1992).

232. 202 Ga. App. at 240, 414 S.E.2d at 253.
233. 935 F.2d 1201 (11th Cir. 1991). The United States District Court through the exercise of diversity jurisdiction was considering a question concerning notice under Georgia's
Little Miller Act. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-82-100'to -105 (1987 & Supp. 1992).
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the project
pursuant to Roanoke Iron's purchase orders occurred on July
ss
15, 1986.

In September 1986, Roanoke Iron filed bankruptcy. Southern Steel
then notified the general contractor that, "because of the substantial
amount Roanoke Iron owed Southern Steel for materials already delivered to the jail, .

...

would be provided unless
no additional28 materials
6

paid for in advance or at delivery.
On November 17, 1986, Southern Steel wrote to the general contractor
informing it that Southern Steel had a number of items previously ordered by Roanoke Iron for which it had not yet been paid. Southern Steel
informed the general contractor that, unless the general contractor requested and paid for them, the items would be returned to inventory.
These materials were then shipped at the general contractor's request to
the site on December 15, 1986. The general contractor also ordered and
paid for other materials requested from Southern Steel after August
1986.236

Southern Steel also provided materials at no charge including screws,
keys, an allen wrench, strike plates, and ten reworked electric locks. The
locks' were repaired because they had burned out on the job site. These
materials were shipped to the site in late November and mid-December
1986.87
On February 6, 1987, Southern Steel sent to United Pacific Insurance
Co., the surety, written notice of its claims against the payment bond for
the unpaid balance of invoices to Roanoke Iron. Suit was subsequently
filed by Southern Steel. United Pacific moved for summary judgment on
the ground that Southern Steel failed to comply with the timely notice
provisions under Georgia's Little Miller Act. 28 8 The district court granted
234. 935 F.2d at 1202.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1202-03.
238. Id. at 1203. O.C.G.A. § 36-82-104(b) (Supp. 1992) provides as follows:
Every person entitled to the protection of the payment bond . . .who has not
been paid in full for labor or material furnished in the prosecution of the work
. . . shall have the right to bring an action on such payment bond . . .for the

amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at the time of the commencement of such
action and to prosecute such action to final execution and judgment for the sum
or sums due him; provided, however, that any person having a direct contractual
relationship with a subcontractor, but no contractual relationship express or implied with the contractor furnishing such payment bond or security deposit, shall
have the right of action upon the payment bond or security deposit upon giving
written notice to the contractor within 90 days from the day on which such person
did perform the last of the material or machinery or equipment for which such
claim is made, stating with substantial 'accuracy the amount claimed and the
name of the party to whom the material was furnished or supplied.
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summary judgment to the surety, because the no-charge items provided
in November and December 1986 were corrective performance and therefore not an event from which measurement for notice purposes could be
calculated. The district court found that the9 last date of original contract
performance required summary judgment."
. Before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Southern Steel argued that most of the no-charge items related back
to and completed earlier shipments of materials supplied pursuant to
purchase orders from Roanoke Iron, thus, constituting the last material
furnished for which claim was made. Southern Steel also argued that the
corrective work was performed not through any fault of its own, but was
necessary to fulfill responsibilities under the original contract so that the
delivery of those items were within the original contract performance. Accordingly, the delivery of the corrective work would be the last date
of the
0
delivery of materials from which notice should be measured.24
The court rejected Southern Steel's first argument based upon a stipulation between the parties which indicated that July 15, 1986, was the last
date of shipment and satisfaction of purchase orders presented by Roanoke Iron."" The court went on to consider Southern Steel's second argument noting that under the Federal Miller Act, repairs do not normally
toll the notice requirement, but that "each circumstance must be judged
on its own facts."2'

The court then focused on the following factors:

"'the value of the materials shipped, the original contract specifications,
the unexpected nature of the work, and the importance of the materials
to the operation of the system in which they are used.' "243 Applying this
analysis to the facts, the court found that an issue of fact existed as to
whether the reworking of the locks was done as part of the original conId.
239. 935 F.2d at 1203.
240. Id. at 12q4.
241. Id. Of course, materials ordered directly by the general contractor and paid for by it
do not come into play since the claim against the surety is predicated upon the failure of
Roanoke Iron to make payment under certain invoices directed to the subcontractor. Thus,
for purposes of this argument the July 15, 1986 date stipulated by the parties would be
controlling.
242. Id. The court noted that Georgia's Little Miller Act was guided in its interpretation
by federal law interpreting the Federal Miller Act. Amcon, Inc. v. Southern Pipe & Supply
Co., 134 Ga. App. 655, 656, 215 S.E.2d 712, 713 (1975); Porter-Lite Corp. v. Warren Scott
Contracting Co., 126 Ga. App. 436, 438-39, 191 S.E.2d 95, 97 (1972). Federal case law construing the Federal Miller Act notes that a sweeping general rule concerning repairs is not
available and requires a factually intensive analysis. Johnson Serv. Co. v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 485 F.2d 164, 173 (5th Cir. 1973).
243. 935 F.2d at 1204-05 (quoting United States ex rel. Georgia Elec. Supply Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 656 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981)).
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tract rather than. merely as repairs.2" The court determined that the
locks were required under the original contract specifications, that the
reworking was necessary through no fault of the supplier, but through the
fault of others, making the repairs unexpected, and that working locks
were important to the operation of the jail.24 5 Accordingly, the summary
24
judgment was reversed.

B. Sureties
Notice to Proceed Against Principal. The supreme court in
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Safeco Insurance Co.,147 answered a question
certified from- the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit pertaining to a creditor's obligation to proceed against a principal
after notice from the surety as failure to do so.2 , 8 "The [plaintiff], Johnson Controls, Inc. ("JCI"), had entered into a subcontract with Ocean
Electric Corporation ("Ocean Electric") for work at the Trident Submarine Training Facility in Kings Bay, Georgia."'249 Safeco Insurance Company ("Safeco") had posted a surety bond guaranteeing Ocean Electric's
performance.250 "Following a performance dispute between JCi and
Ocean, JCI notified Ocean Electric Corporation that it was in default
[and] JCI submitted a claim to the [surety]." ' 51 The surety responded by
letter dated November 4, 1986, as follows:
Johnson Controls [JCI] has asserted and continues to assert various
claims against both Ocean and SAFECO in regard to the construction
project located at Kings Bay, Georgia.
You are notified that Johnson Controls [JCI] should proceed to collect
any debt it believes it has owing to it from Ocean immediately. Johnson
[JCI] should proceed to institute adversary proceedings against Ocean

Electric immediately ....

202

Johnson Controls instead elected to complete the job by hiring another
subcontractor, although the project was terminated by the Navy on December 16, 1986, before completion. Ocean Electric subsequently declared
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Id.
Id.
261
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1205.
at 1205-06.
at 1206.
Ga. 364, 404 S.E.2d 556 (1991).
at 364-65, 404 S.E.2d at 556-57.
at 365, 404 S.E.2d at 557.
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bankruptcy and on November 23, 1987, JCI filed suit against Safeco as
surety to recover $117,000 in excess costs incurred after the default.""
The United States District Court granted summary judgment in favor
of the surety on its argument that JCI failed to file suit within three
months after its letter of November 4, 1986.254 The question for the Georgia Supreme Court was whether the selection by JCI of an available contractual remedy, which contemplated deferral of the time of payment by
Ocean Electric, ameliorated the requirement to file suit within three
months after notice by the surety of its obligation to do so.155 The supreme court found that the time for measuring the accrual of the cause of
action against Ocean Electric would be at the time of breach of contract,
that is, when JCI declared Ocean Electric to be in default of the
2
agreement. s
This ruling creates pitfalls for the unwary contractor or subcontractor,
who may feel a false sense of security in following a remedy available to it
under an agreement it may have with another entity. By following that
remedy, it may cut off other rights it has under payment and performance bonds unless those rights are pursued diligently and simultaneously.
Length of Time of Sureties Liability. Previously in McDevitt &
Street Co. v. K-C Air Conditioning Service, Inc.,257 the construction of
the contract as it applied between a contractor and subcontractor was
discussed. Also before the court of appeals in this case were questions
concerning the length of time for which the surety would be responsible
under its bond obligations and the types of damages that may apply
against a surety when in bad faith the surety refuses to honor its obliga253. Id.
254. Id. at 365-66, 404 S.E.2d at 557. O.C.G.A. § 10-7-24 (1989) provides:
Any surety, guarantor, or endorser, at any time after the debt on which he is liable
becomes due, may give notice in writing to the creditor, his agent, or any person
having possession or control of the obligation, to proceed to collect the debt from
the principal . . . and, if the creditor or holder refuses or fails to commence an
action for the space of three months after such notice . . . the endorser, guarantor, or surety giving the notice. . . shall be discharged. No notice which does not
state the county in which the principal resides shall be considered a compliance
with the requirements of this Code section.

Id.
255. 261 Ga. at 365, 404 S.E.2d at 557. Implicit in this statement of the issue before the
supreme court is the fact that JCI could bring in another subcontractor to complete the
work and then charge Ocean the difference between what it would have cost under the original contract and what it in fact cost JCI to bring in the completing subcontractor.
256. Id. at 366, 404 S.E.2d at 557.
257. 203 Ga. App. 640, 418 S.E.2d 87 (1992). For further treatment of this case in connection with the construction of contracts, see supra text accompanying notes 34-49. -
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tions.'5 s The performance bond posted by Wassau Insurance, the surety
on the project, indicated that the surety's undertakings remained in force
and effect until the subcontractor had finished all of its obligations under
the subcontract during the life of any guaranty required under that contract. The trial court had construed the bond to relieve the surety of its
liability under the bond at the conclusion of the one year warranty. The
contract obligated the subcontractor to correct defective work discovered
within one year from the date of acceptance or within such longer period
as may have been provided within the contract documents." As previously discussed, that period was extended to include any period of time as
may be prescribed by law and incorporated implicitly in the statute of
limitations applicable to breaches of contract. 6 0 O.C.G.A. section 9-3-24
provides for a six year statute of limitations."" As a result, the surety was
also obligated under its bond for this same period of time. 22
VIII. CONCLUSION

The economics of the construction industry demand that the construction lawyer plan for business failure at every turn. Accordingly, construction lawyers must be intimately familiar with the changes in the materialman's and mechanic's lien statutory framework. Also, there is a definite,
albeit slow, trend to expand the liability for construction failures to lenders and sureties, further emphasizing the need for proper advanced planning to protect clients from business failures.

258. 203 Ga. App. at 642-44, 418 S.E.2d at 91-92.
259. Id. at 643-45, 418 S.E.2d at 91-93.
260. Id. at 645, 418 S.E.2d at 92.
261. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 (1982).
262. 203 Ga. App. at 645, 418 S.E.2d at 93. The court also found that a jury question
existed on whether the surety acted in bad faith in refusing to honor its obligations under
the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 10-7-30. That statute is virtually identical with O.C.G.A. § 33-46 applying to insurance generally and applies a 25% penalty and all reasonable attorney fees
against a surety who refuses a demand for payment in bad faith. 203 Ga. App. at 645-46, 418
S.E.2d at 93-94.

